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The Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact
Private Law
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether home
rule municipalities in Ohio have invaded the private law area,
and if so, through what constitutional provisions and to what ex-
tent. It is the generally accepted theory that in the absence of an
express grant to the municipalities the power to enact private law'
rests with the state. The idea is so firmly entrenched it may be re-
garded as unwritten constitutional law.2
The general grant of legislative power under the Home Rule
Amendment of the Ohio Constitution is contained in Article XVIII,
Section 3, set forth herewith:
"Municipalities shall have -authority to exercise all
powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce
within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws."
It should be noted that the above section contains two separate
and distinct grants to the municipality, one absolute in terms which
is supreme in regard to state legislation, and the other limited by
the phrase, "not in conflict with general laws."3 It also should be
noted that the term "conflict" has been interpreted to mean the
situation where an ordinance permits or licenses that which the
statute forbids and vice versa.4 "General law" has been interpreted
to mean a statute or legislation enacted by the general assembly.
If municipal corporations legislate in the private law area
the power to do so either must be inherent or derived from the
state constitution and, more specifically, from the Home Rule
Amendment. Although the inherent power theory occasionally has
been espoused, Ohio, along with the overwhelming majority of
states, has rejected it., Ohio municipalities derive all their powers
of local self-government directly from the constitution. 7
1".. . all that part of the law which is administered between citizen
and citizen, or which is concerned with the definition, regulation, and en-
forcement of rights in cases where both the person in whom the right
inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is incident are private
individuals." BLACK, LAw DIcTIoNARY 1419 (3d ed. 1933).
FFREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION § 7 (1932).
.'See State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 136, 102
N.E. 670, 684 (1913) (dissenting opinion).
'Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
"Leis v. The Cleveland Railway Co., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 7&
(1920).
'State ex tel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670
(1913).
'Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595
(1923).
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Since the power is a constitutional grant, our attention is
directed to Article XVIII, Section 3, and its two grants of power.
If private law has been enacted it must be pursuant to the power
under one of these grants." It would seem that the source of the
power is not found in the first of these grants because of the fol-
lowing considerations.
It is apparent that in view of practical social and economic
considerations uniform law in a geographical territory as wide
as possible is most desirable.- Technological developments in the
field of communication and transportation make it desirable, if
not imperative, that -the citizenry of a nation move and trans-
act business with such degree of certainty that whatever they do
and wherever they may be, the "rules of the game" are the same,
or at least not widely divergent. It takes no imagination to forsee
the results if each hamlet and village had the power to determine
under what conditions a contract would be valid.
From a purely pragmatic viewpoint, a system of jurisprudence
under which the yarious laws of several sovereigns -are interpreted
and enforced by the instrumentalities of another sovereign poses
practical considerations of expediency and justice, the magnitude
of which only can be conjectural. At the minimum such a system
would be calculated to aggravate the problems of an already over-
burdened judiciary.
It is believed that the legislative power devolved upon the
municipal corporation under the grant of "all powers of local
self-government" embraces only the'power of local organization
and administration. It does not include the power to enact law
governing ordinary civil relations.9
If, then, the source of municipalities' power to enact private
law does not lie in the powers of local self-government, it would
seem that it must come, if at all, from the limited grant of power
"to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sani-
tary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with gen-
eral laws." From an examination of the cases dealing with the
grant, it is manifest that municipalities legitimately can enact
legislation having an indirect impact of great force upon the area
of private law. For example, an ordinance enacted by the city of
Cleveland was permitted to stand although it regulated the maxi-
mum number of hours employees were permitted to work when
engaged in public works.'0 A greater impact upon private rights
is apparent in the area of zoning regulations where private rights
are restricted as to the use of property and violations may be en-
'The possibility of enactment of private law under OHIO CONST. Art.
XVIII, § 4 is discussed in a subsequent paragraph.
gFordham, Local Government, 9 LA. MuNIc. REv. 40 (1946).
"°Stange v. Cleveland, 94 Ohio St. 377, 114 N.E. 261 (1916).
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joined.1 In another case, a taxicab owner was required to post
a liability bond as a condition precedent to operation of his cab
upon the streets of the city.12 Examples are numerous wherein
the violation of a local traffic ordinance has been held to be neg-
ligence per se.13 It is apparent that a reasonable and non-arbitrary
police regulation validly enacted by a municipality may affect
the rights of a private individual and still not fall within the cate-
gory of private law in the sense in which it is used herein.14
A municipality operating a public utility under the authority
granted in Article XVIII, Section 4, may affect rights of a private
individual to a limited extent. It has been held that a property
owner may be liable under authority of an ordinance for his
tenant's water bill. The liability may be enforced through court
action and/or denial of further service to the property. A lien will
not attach to the property under authority of the ordinance. 15 It
is apparent that again we have impact upon but not the enact-
ment of private law.
The above analysis would appear to indicate that there is no
area in which the enactment of private law is contemplated. How-
ever, in the case of Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co. 6 the city of Cleveland
adopted an ordinance requiring the motormen of streetcars op-
erated within the city to exercise all possible care. The plaintiff
was injured by 'a streetcar operated by an agent of the defendant
company and the trial court found the defendant liable by holding
it to the standard of care established by the ordinance. The su-
preme court affirmed the decision on the ground that the ordinance
was a reasonable police regulation, was applicable only within the
city and was not in conflict with general law since no statute had
been passed by the general assembly establishing a standard of
care for streetcar operators. The common law standard of care was
held not to be a general law in the sense that the term was used
in Article XVIII, Section 3. Private law here was enacted by the
city since the ordinance not only established a standard of care
in an action between two individuals but also, in this particular
case, allowed a recovery which would not have been possible un-
der the common law standard of care. The court in its opinion
did not discuss this aspect of the case but based the decision on the
grounds already stated.
Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
State ex Tel. McBride v. Deckebach, 117 Ohio St. 227, 157 N.E. 758
(1927).
. Patton v. Pennsylvania R. R., 136 Ohio St. 159, 16 Ohio Op. 114,
24 N.E.2d 597 (1939).
I Fordham, supra note 9, at 40.
'Pfau v. Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E.2d 172 (1943).
16101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920).
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In contrast, in Wilson v. East Cleveland'17 the court held in-
valid an attempted regulation of private law by the city. The gen-
eral assembly by General Code Section 3714 imposed a liability on
municipalities for breach of the duty of maintaining their streets
in a safe condition. The city charter contained a provision that
required any person bringing a suit against the city under Section
3714 to give written notice of the claim within thirty days after
the cause of action accrued. The court stated that failure to com-
ply with the charter provision would result in a waiver to the right
of the cause of action and that such a condition precedent was in-
valid as being in conflict with general law since the statute im-
posing the liability did not prescribe such a condition for the
attaching of the liability. To reach this result it was necessary for
the court to expand the meaning of conflict as defined in the Ohio
cases dealing with the Home Rule Amendment. 8 Again, the court
did not discuss the effect of the ordinance upon private law. Con-
ceivably, the court could have based its decision upon the munic-
ipality's lack of power to enact private law if such power, is, in
fact, lacking.
The case of Carnabuci v. City of Norwalk 9 presents another
interesting facet of the problem. A zoning ordinance was adopted
by the city and put into effect in 1938. In 1941 the defendant ap-
plied to .the State Department of Liquor Control for a permit to
manufacture wine at her residence which was located in 'a zoned
residential district, a fact stated in the application. The Depart-
ment of Liquor Control issued the permit. Thus, a permit issued
under the authority of a valid general law authorized the doing
of an act which was prohibited by an ordinance of the city. It
should be noted that zoning is an exercise of the police power. The
court split 2-1, the majority saying:
"The power and authority of the city to enact the ordi-
nance is -at least commensurate with that of the Depart-
ment of Liquor Control to issue the permit, and it and the
city must take cognizance of -the lawful exercise of the
power and authority possessed by the other."
The dissenting judge stated flatly that there was a direct con-
flict and that the ordinance must fall.
In all probability Ohio municipalities under the Home Rule
Amendment have not been granted the authority to enact private
law but thus far this question -has never been authoritatively de-
cided. Admitting the soundness of the Leis case, it would appear
7121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
'Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923);
Wilson v. Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N.E. 187 (1935), overruled on
other grounds, Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio. St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
1170 Ohio'App. 429, 46 N.E.2d 773 (1942).
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that the court has created an area in which municipalities may
conceivably enact private law. This would seem to follow from
the fact that general law as defined by the court does not include
the common law of the state. Conceding that municipalities ex-
pressly must be granted the power to enact private law, we are
faced with the anomalous situation in which the court has given by
implication an express grant of this power by the definition of
general law. Thus, the phrase in the constitution is interpreted to
read, "to adopt and enforce . . . regulations as are not in conflict
with laws passed by the general assembly." Therefore private law
which is in the realm of the police power will stand even though
in conflict with common law. It should be noted that general law
as usually construed includes common law, and therefore, this field
is not open to municipalities in other states.20 Room for further
speculation is presented by the holding in the Carnabuci case. The
divided court there upheld a regulation which was in direct conflict
with state law. The regulation was in the field of zoning, which we
have classed as having impact upon private law, but the rationale
used by the court would be equally valid in other fields of municipal
endeavor and could be, under the authority of the Leis case, ex-
tended to the field of private law.
In conclusion, it would seem that a salutary result has been
achieved. The areas in which it is possible to enact private law are
confined to (a) legislation under the police power which changes
only the common law, and (b) that area created by the court's
extension or restriction of the term "conflict". 1 Thus, the only
municipal legislation that could invade the field of private law
would be such as was vital to the welfare of the municipality and
not inimical tc the interests of the state. Any municipal ordinance
not conforming to these requirements could be nullified by the state
legislature acting in the common law field or by the state courts in
applying the term "conflict" to a set ,of facts. Sharply defined lines
seldom can be drawn in the fields of government. The areas created
serve a very real purpose in minimizing the unavoidable friction
between state and city governments.
W. P. Davidson
J. F. Shumaker
FREUND, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 7.
'Wilson v. East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
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